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MOMENTUM AND HOUSE PRICE GROWTH IN THE U.S:  
ANATOMY OF A “BUBBLE”  
 
This paper analyzes the bubble in property values in the U.S. in the period from 1999 through 
2005. We define a bubble as a regime shift characterized by a change in the properties of 
house price deviations from underlying “fundamentals” that become more self-sustaining 
and/or more volatile than in other periods. We model the fundamentals of house price growth 
as lagged adjustments of prices to the expected present value of future service flows (imputed 
rent) from owner-occupied properties. We then study the autoregressive behavior of the 
errors generated from the estimated fundamentals equations with panel data from 44 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas for the period of 1980-2005. We find evidence of momentum 
in house price growth throughout the period, but momentum increased after 1999. Breaking 
down the period further, we find that the bubble happened mostly after 2003; it was for a 
relatively short period and was characterized by a series of positive, seemingly random, 
shocks. Before that, price changes were reasonably well explained by the “fundamentals,” 





The property market in the United States over the last decade has been widely perceived as 
having had a bubble. Figure 1 depicts the national rates of growth of house prices, ten-year 
Treasuries, an index of imputed homeowner rents, and the Consumer Price Index. The Figure 
shows acceleration in house prices after 1999 that is not consistent with the other data. We 
analyze post 1999 behavior of house price growth in the U.S. in order to characterize the 
change in price growth. We stop after 2005 when the price surge stopped. In particular, we 
look at the extent to which we can characterize the period as having a “bubble” relative to the 
“fundamentals” of price growth. We define a bubble as a regime shift that is characterized by 
a change in the properties of deviations of actual house price growth from its fundamentals. 
The fundamentals come from an estimated equation specifying house price growth as a 
function of lagged responses to the present value of expected future service flows (imputed 
rent). In a bubble, a shock to the growth rates is more self-sustaining (increased momentum) 
and/or more volatile than in other periods.  
 
Various methods have been used to test for bubbles in financial markets. Early work relied on 
econometric methods such as variance-bound tests. Since then, tests for stationarity and 
cointegration as tests for absence of speculative bubbles have been proposed (see, for 
example, Diba and Grossman (1988) and Hamilton and Whiteman (1985)). Evans (1991), 
however, shows that these methods tend to reject the presence of the bubbles too often even if 
they are artificially induced in the Monte Carlo simulations. The literature on testing bubbles 
then moved on to the introduction of more effective regime switching models first presented 
by Blanchard and Watson (1982). These models look at bubbles as changes in regime, and 
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then analyze properties of price processes in and out of the bubble regimes.1 Our model is a 
variant of these regime shift models.  
 
Apart from Roche (2001), who studied the Dublin market from 1976 to 1999, regime-
switching models have not been widely applied in explaining house price bubbles. The 
structure of our model is similar to papers on housing bubbles by Black et al. (2006), Chan et 
al. (2001), Hwang et al. (2006) and Taipalus (2006). Wheaton and Nechayef (2007) address 
the same problem by looking at the extent to which price growth in the bubble period can be 
explained by a model of the fundamentals estimated from a previous period. Their approach 
is similar to a regime shift model. Coleman et al (2008) analyze a similar question from the 
standpoint of the role of the subprime market in the surge in house prices after 2003. Van 
Order and Dougherty (1991) test a rent-price model similar to the one developed in this 
paper. An alternative line of research looks at bubbles as coming from “overshooting” of 
estimated difference equations for house price (e.g., Capozza et al (2004)) 
 
Our principal result is that while we find evidence of momentum in the deviations from house 
price growth fundamentals throughout the period, momentum increased after 1999. We do 
not find much evidence of explosive momentum, although momentum after 1999 was close 
to explosive in some cities. We do not find evidence of an increase in volatility in the 
disturbances of the error process. We also find that momentum operates with a long lag. 
Breaking down the period further, we find that 2003 was a watershed year. The bubble 
happened mostly after 2003; that is, it was for a relatively short period and a period that was 
associated with big changes in markets, such as the rise of the subprime market and subprime 
securtization and a sharp decline in short term interest rates. Before that price changes were 
                                                          
1 In a recent study, Baddeley (2005) incorporates destabilizing effects from bubbles, herding, and frenzies in the 
study of regime shifts conditional on institutional and political changes. She argues that in a less informed 
market such as real estate, thence where herding can be serious, and where financing and uncertainty are crucial 
factors in determining the time to invest, market booms and busts tend to be more pronounced. 
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by and large “explained” by the fundamentals, for instance the decline in long term real rates 
in the early part of the 1999-2005 period. 
 
The next section provides a discussion on bubbles and regime switching models that have 
been widely applied in financial markets. Section III presents our model of house price 
growth. In particular, we develop the fundamental equation from which bubbles in the market 
are tested. Section IV describes the data employed, while Section V presents the results. 
Section VI discusses the robustness of our tests, and Section VII analyses the momentum 
phenomenon further. Section VIII concludes the study. 
 
II. Bubbles and Regime Switching 
There has been considerable research on modeling the price movements of stock markets in 
order to model deviations from the fundamental values.2  Two versions of these models are 
the fads model proposed by Summers (1986) and the stochastic bubbles model suggested by 
Blanchard and Watson (1982). The latter type was subsequently extended by Van Norden and 
Schaller (1993, 1996), and Van Norden, (1996), who use switching regressions to describe 
the time-varying relationship between returns and deviations from the fundamentals.  
 
The Fads model 
Borrowing from Fama and French (1988) and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991), the 
logarithm of the market price of an asset is divided into (1) a non-stationary part that 
describes the fundamental price and (2) a stationary component that implies the returns are 
predictable (from previous returns). Both components are autoregressive and subject to 
                                                          
2 Other proposed sources of bubbles are, for example, overconfidence of speculators coming from two different 
groups such that the deviations in price expectations create trading (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)), and money 
illusion as a result of reduction in inflation, and hence nominal mortgage costs (Brunnermeier and Julliard 
(2006)). 
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different white noises with their own distributions. Given a proxy for the fundamental price 
subject to measurement error, all these imply 
(1)  ( ) ttxttt epppp +−+=−+ 101 ββ  
where pt is the log of the market price at time t, pxt is the available proxy of the fundamental 
price, and ( )2,0~ ωσiidet .  
 
This regression equation gives the excess returns as a function of differences between the log 
of the proxy for the fundamental and the log of the observed price. In finance models a 
commonly used proxy is the dividend, while the explanatory variable in the equation is the 
lagged log dividend/price ratio. Hence, price growth is a function of current price and lagged 
fundamentals. Because the current price (via equation (1)) depends on the dividend/price 
ratio lagged again, iterating equation (1) implies that price appreciation depends on a long 
lagged function of the proxy for fundamentals.  
 
However, in this model, the assumptions that the fundamentals follow a random walk and 
that the fads part is stationary are not likely to hold. This is because of obvious inefficiencies 
in real estate markets: (1) transaction costs in real estate are high, (2) owner-occupiers are 
only in the market occasionally, and (3) the tax benefits accrued to homeowners reduce their 
costs but not costs for speculators, thus making arbitrage difficult. Hence, some modification 
is required in order to apply the model. 
 
The Regime Switching Model 
When the regression error term, te , is heteroscedastic, the fads model can lead to regime-
switching for stochastic bubbles (they are stochastic because they either survive or collapse, 
subject to some probabilities). The existence of two possible outcomes of the bubbles means 
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that there are two regimes generating market returns. We extend the regime-switching model 
by relaxing the assumption that the error term in the autoregressive fundamental price process 
is white noise. We assume that te  follows an autoregressive process. A regime shift is 
characterized by an increase in the volatility of the disturbance in the autoregressive process 
for te  and an increase in “momentum,” which is measured as increase in the sum of the 
coefficients of the lagged te in the process. 
 
III. Modeling the Fundamentals of House Price Growth 
Given an information set, tΩ , the fundamental value of a property is assumed to be given by 














where R is the rental income, in this case imputed services of the property, and D is the risk-
adjusted discount factor. In addition, the transversality condition that the second term 










ititt DREP . 
 
For this to be applicable to owner-occupied housing, imputed rent must be measurable by 
some form of market rent. We take this to be the actual market rent of comparable properties, 
which holds if the equation is applied to an owner who is just indifferent between owning and 
renting. In that case, the first order conditions for owners and renters will be the same; and 
the present value formulation that applies to landlords’ valuation will apply to owner-
occupiers’ valuation. The advantage of this approach is that it saves having to develop a 
complicated model of housing demand and supply, which is not likely to be stable. For 
instance, Glaeser et al (2005) emphasize the role of inelastic supply in house price growth, 
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especially due to local policy variation; our rent variable captures this effect without having 
to estimate, directly or indirectly, supply elasticities across cities and time. 
 
Estimated Equations 
Equation (3) is potentially quite complicated because of the covariance among the variables 
such as those coming from stock-flow adjustments of rents and prices over time. For instance, 
we should expect interest rates and future rents to be correlated because a rise in interest rates 
will, given rents, lower property values. On the other hand, it induces less production in the 
future, and thus higher rents. Indeed, if supply is perfectly elastic in the long run, a rise in 
interest rates will eventually produce a decline in rents without long run price change.  
 
We consider first a simple model with constant interest rates and a steady growth rate of 
expected rents. We can adopt the Gordon model for stock prices to property value as 
(4)   )*/( απαα π +−= ttitt iRP  
where )*( απαα π +− tti i is the “cap rate” for housing, i, the interest rate, and *π  is the 
expected rates of growth of rent. The coefficients iα  and πα  do not necessarily equal one, as 
they are in the standard Gordon model, because of tax and other effects (such as cash flow 
effects from high nominal rates and lack of price indexed mortgages).  
 
Taking first differences and logarithms of equation (4), we have 
(5) ( )*ln ttitt iGP πααπ π−Δ−=  
where tGP  is the growth rate of house prices and tπ  is the current growth rate of rents, all at 
time t. Equation (5) can be approximated by  
(6)  *ttittt iGP πββαπρ π Δ+Δ−=−=  
where tρ  is the rate of growth of house prices minus the rate of growth of rent. The βs should 
be positive. This can be estimated by assuming that *πΔ  is a function of past levels of πΔ . 
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Preliminary estimates of equation (6) do not work well; longer lags in the adjustment process 
are necessary for the model to fit well and/or make sense. We therefore consider adjustment 










Δ+Δ−= ∑ πγγαρ π . 
Equation (7) imposes the constraint that an increase in growth rate of rent of 1% will increase 
house price growth by 1% in the long run. The presence of α allows rents and prices to have 
different trends, for instance, because of measurement errors.  
 
Estimates of equation (7) generate residuals, te , which are assumed to follow the 
autoregressive process 
(8)   t
T
j





where tυ  is iid. The sum of coefficients of lagged error terms must be greater than one for an 
explosive bubble. Our tests are thus on (1) the amount of, and changes in, momentum as 
measured by jt
T
t −∑ ω , and (2) changes in the variance of tυ , during the post 1999 period. 
 
IV. Data and Estimation 
Our measure of house price is the quarterly house price index released by the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO),3 which provides a repeat sales house price 
index for over 100 individual Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) since 1980. The rent 
series is the “owner’s equivalent rent of primary residence” obtained from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, from which we also acquire the local Consumer Price Indices. After 
matching these three series, data for 44 MSAs can be used. We use the 10-year Treasury as a 
measure of nominal risk-free rate.4 
                                                          3 OFHEO has recently been restructured as the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA). 
4 We have tried to proxy the real interest rate by the ten-year Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS). 
However, since the earliest available TIPs begin listing in 1997, we are not able to obtain a reliable real interest 
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We have three main data concerns: 
 
 First, the repeat sales methodology price index may not hold quality constant. The OFHEO 
index looks at the same house twice without adjusting for home improvement between 
observations, and hence may overestimate growth in house prices. This may be offset by 
similar errors in the rent index. 
 
Second, measured rent may grow too slowly because of the agency cost of renting and 
measurement errors in the rental index. That is, even if we have matched prices and rents for 
owners indifferent between owning and renting, there is always reason to believe that renters 
take less good care of property than owners do. Both Crone et al (2006) and Gordon and van 
Goethem (2004) discuss the extent to which the CPI rental index has underestimated rent 
growth over time (especially before 1985). If any of the above is the case, then there will be a 
tendency for our measure of P to grow faster than our measure of R (that is, for α in equation 
(6) to be positive), which is indeed what we find.  
 
Third, the price and rent series do not necessarily match up in the sense of the price series 
representing price growth for a household that is indifferent between owning and renting, 
which is probably a household in a relatively low tax bracket. We note here that the OFHEO 
index only covers prices of houses whose mortgages are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae 
or Freddie Mac. This imposes a limit, which is indexed to house prices over time, and thereby 
excludes approximately the top 10% of the market (by number of loans). Hence, the price 
data does at least exclude those owners who for tax reasons are the furthest from being 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rate series. We do not use mortgage rates because, among other things, they include premia for prepayment risk. 
There is a risk premium attached to i, which we assume is a part of D, the discount factor. 
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indifferent between owning and renting. We have not chosen to use the widely used Case-
Shiller Indexes because of the wider coverage of the OFHEO Indexes. 
 
With these data, we first estimate variants of the fundamentals of price growth from the 
specifications of ρ in equation (7) over the entire period, varying the models by changing lag 
lengths. From each fundamental equation, residuals are generated and modeled as given by 
equation (8), for various lag lengths. For each residual equation of particular lag length, four 
versions are estimated by dividing the MSA sample into two groups: fast growing (bubble 
candidate) MSAs (those that grew on average at a 2% per year faster rate than rents grew), 
and the rest (non bubble MSAs), and dividing both bubble and non bubble samples into pre 
and post 1999. The bubble MSAs are denoted by asterisks in Appendix 1. A regime change is 
characterized by a change in the error process. We test for changes in the sum of the 
coefficients in estimates of equation (8) and changes in the variance of the residuals in the 
error regression in (8). 
 
V. Results 
Estimates of the Fundamentals 
Table 1 summarizes the estimates of our fundamental equation (7), using the entire panel of 
data across MSAs for the entire sample period and with exogenous variables lagged 12, 16, 
20, and 24 quarters. The variables mostly have the expected signs. The signs within groups 
are also consistent, generally negative for interest rate and positive for past rent growth. The 
model implies a significant lag in the effect of an interest rate change on house prices. Table 
2 presents a summary of the results of the coefficients for various lag lengths of the 
fundamentals. Longer lag specifications fit better, and their coefficients make more economic 
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sense.5 The nonbubble MSAs tend to have smaller constant terms, averaging close to zero vs. 
around 1.5% per year in the bubble MSAs. 
 
The coefficients suggest overshooting. For instance, looking at the longer lags, rent increases 
are initially associated with price acceleration, as expected; but the sign turns negative after 
around four years. This implies that an interest rate shock is associated with positive effects 
on price growth which turn negative in a year or so. Note that there is a sharp turn to positive 
coefficients after five years in the longest lagged equation, leading to small but positive long 
run effect (see Table 2). Hence, the model suggests the possibility of a small long run effect 
of interest rate changes, perhaps because of a long run supply adjustment, but only after a 
long adjustment period. 
 
Error Equations 
We use the fundamental equations to generate errors equations, and then examine 
autoregressive properties of these errors as given by equation (8). As described above, we 
divide the available data into bubble and nonbubble MSAs, and we produce separate 
estimates of the error model by these MSA divisions in the pre- and post-1999 period. Results 
for the residuals from the 12-lag fundamental equation are shown in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 
depicts the corresponding findings for the 16-lag model6, while the sums of the residual 
coefficients are provided in Table 3. We also estimated error equations from the fundamental 
equation with 8 lags and 12 lags with lagged ρ on the right hand side, which give similar 
results as shown in Appendices 4 and 5. We therefore focus on the fundamental equation 
without lagged ρ. 
 
                                                          
5 We initially tried to establish the fundamental model with local CPI to capture the MSA specific inflation, and 
in a way, deduce the real interest rate. However, adding the variable does not increase the explanatory power 
and intuition of the model significantly. We therefore maintain the current model for parsimony. 
6 Results on 20-lag and 24-lag models are available upon request. 
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From Table 3, the sums of coefficients in all of the specifications are positive; and in all 
cases, the sum increased after 1999. On average, the increase in sums was around 0.2 or 0.3; 
the bubble MSAs mostly have higher sums, averaging around 0.8.  
 
Basic results for the coefficient sums are that momentum exists throughout the period, an 
increase in momentum after 1999, long adjustment lags, and general agreement about the 
increase in momentum across different estimates (varying by lag) of the fundamentals. The 
latter provides evidence of a regime shift in the post-1999 period. However, there is no 
evidence of an explosive bubble associated with the regime shift; coefficient sums are always 
significantly less than one (see footnote to Table 2).7 The change in momentum is 
economically significant; the sums in bubble cities went from around 0.5 to around 0.8. 
Consider a 1% shock in one quarter. In the pre bubble case the long run effect of the shocks 
on price relative to rent is 1%/(1 - 0.5) or 2%, but becomes 1%/(1 - 0.8) or 5% in the post 
bubble period. 
 
It is possible that the bubbles became bigger in the later part of the post-bubble period. We 
changed the cutoffs for the bubble period to later periods. For both 2002 through 2005 and 
2003 through 2005, the coefficient sums are either the same as those in the post-1999 period 
as a whole or, in the case of the bubble MSAs, lower. We discuss this second period below. 
 
Volatility 
Table 4 presents results for testing the changes in the volatility of the errors in equation (8). 
We apply the Goldfield-Quandt test for the differences in variances. The results of the tests 
can be read from the “Pre/Post-1999 Test” rows. Bold face numbers show cases where the 
hypothesis that the variances are different is not rejected. In the nonbubble MSAs, the 
                                                          
7 We have also performed unit root test on all the MSAs to reinforce the argument. 
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hypothesis is mostly rejected (except the one with the fundamental equation of 16 lags and 12 
lags on the error equation). In the bubble MSAs, the hypothesis is almost never rejected; and 
the variance fell after 1999 in all those cases. Hence, there is some evidence of a regime shift 
in the bubble MSAs; however, the shift is toward a somewhat more stable regime after 1999.8   
 
In order to verify that the cutoff year of 1999 is robust, we also tried various cutoff years such 
as 2002 and 2003. While results are not shown here, we find that variances did go up in both 
the post-1999 versus 2002-2005 and post-1999 versus the 2003-2005 periods, but differences 
are not statistically significant. We can thus conclude that our results are not sensitive to the 
cutoff point at 1999. Overall volatility did go up, due the increased momentum, but not 
because of increase in the (conditional) volatility of the white noise part. 
 
VI. Robustness of the Fundamentals 
We estimated variations of the fundamentals to see if the error equations still lead to findings 
that are similar to the ones we obtained in the previous section. We first separated the data set 
for the fundamentals into those for bubble MSAs and non-bubble MSAs and estimated 
separate panel regressions (regression results depicted in Appendix 6). The rationale is that, 
assuming bubble and non-bubble markets are separate groups, intra-group markets might 
share identical effects from the factors in the fundamental equation, but not inter-group 
markets. As expected, the error equations (with 8, 12, and 16 lags), shown in Appendix 7, are 
different between the two groups of MSAs. The test results of differences in variances 
between pre-bubble and post-bubble periods are depicted in Panel A of Appendix 9. The 
sensitivity to a change in the regression does not however alter our previous conclusions 
about changes in momentum.  
                                                          
8 We have also tested the variances of the 44 individual MSAs. There are on average one or two MSAs that have 
statistically significant change in variance between the pre- and post-bubble periods in all of the cases. We 
therefore omit the results here for purpose of simplicity. 
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Our second variation included the inflation rate into the fundamental equation. This allows 
the discount rate to be thought of composed of a real rate plus real rent growth, and these 
might not have the same coefficients (e.g., because of different measurement errors). 
Furthermore, local inflation may contain information about rent, or its determinants that is 
not in the rental equivalent index (e.g., the rental data series might be too smooth or grow too 
slowly relative to the true numbers). The error equation results are in Appendix 8, and the 
comparison of variances in the pre- and post-1999 period is exhibited in Panel B of Appendix 
9. The basic results are about the same.  
 
VII. How much is explained by Fundamentals? 
We do not get a significantly separate regime shift after 2002. Nonetheless, that period is 
problematic. It is probably too short to be able to differentiate statistically from the entire 
bubble period. However, it does show sharp acceleration in house prices (see Figure 1). This 
period coincided with the sudden decrease in short term interest rates, a sudden increase in 
the share of subprime loans and subprime securitization in the market and a sharp increase in 
the use of Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) in this market. This was at a time when short-
term rates were unusually low relative to long-term rates. Appeal to the Modigliani 
Irrelevance Theorem suggests that while the use of ARMs is fine, it should be largely 
irrelevant; the rate for discounting cash flows of long-term assets like housing is still a long-
term rate. To the extent that the advent of subprime ARMs stimulated purchase of housing 
because a new class of homeowners discounted at low short term ARM rates (along with 
poor underwriting of subprime loans), we have a potentially large shock to the fundamentals, 
which should in turn generate momentum.  
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To get a finer picture of the period, we simulated the fundamentals models to see how much 
of the actual change in prices, by MSA and nationally, was “explained” by the predictions of 
the estimated fundamentals models during the first part of the period (1999-2002) and the 
second (2002-2005). Table 5 depicts results using the version of the fundamental equation in 
Table 1 with 20 lags (results are similar for the 24 lag model). The second column gives the 
actual cumulative price change over the period. The third column is the actual cumulative 
rent increase. The fourth column is to have the third column divided by the second, i.e., the 
share of price growth “explained” by rent growth alone. The fifth column is the cumulative 
increase in the price to rent ratio. The sixth is the percentage of increase that is explained by 
the model (the ratio of predicted to actual). The last column is the fraction of overall change 
in price explained both rent growth and the model.  
 
For instance, in the rows for the period of 2003-2005 in Panel A (that is, for non bubble 
MSAs), the actual average cumulative price change for 20 quarters was 0.18913 (about 19%) 
while the actual average cumulative rent change amounts to 0.04505, which accounts for 
23.82% of the total price change (the fourth column). The price to rent ratio grew by 0.14408. 
The fundamental equation explained 41.26% of this, and rent growth and the model 
explained 54.44% of the overall change in prices.  
 
The table suggests that the fundamentals did a reasonably good job of explaining the first part 
of the bubble period, and the estimated equation explained over half of the increase in prices 
relative to rents.  This was probably due to the decline in long term Treasury rates over the 
period. However, very little is explained, especially in the bubble MSAs, in the second part of 
the period. This suggests that there was not much of a bubble before 2003 and that most of 
the high house price growth was explained by low long term rates. However, the long term 
rates did not fall at the end of the period and that appears as the main part of the bubble. 
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Figures 2a and 2b depict the average (across MSAs) levels of the white noise part of the error 
process. In both Figures the high levels of the errors is striking. There was clearly a major 
shift at the end of the period. From mid 2002 until the end of 2005 (10 quarters) the sum of 
the disturbances in the nonbubble MSAs was 9.3 %, and 16.8% in the bubble MSAs. Hence, 
while the increase in momentum mattered, a very large part of the bubble happened in the 
later part of the period, did not last very long, and was seemingly random. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
Perhaps the best way to characterize housing markets during our sample period is that (1) 
there were always bubbles in the sense of disturbances generating momentum, (2) while the 
post-1999 period experienced a regime shift with increased momentum, (3) but not 
conditional volatility. Although our equations for the fundamentals of house price growth 
changed under different assumptions, the errors from those equations consistently show that 
momentum increased after 1999 and volatility did not change much. The regime shift was 
weaker in the bubble candidate cities, which had shown high growth throughout the period 
and higher post-1999 momentum. The increase in momentum is economically significant.  
 
When we break the bubble period into pre and post 2002, we see a sharp change in that the 
fundamentals do a much worse job after 2002. Apparently 2003 was a watershed year. Going 
into that year there was a strong housing market, fueled by low long term real interest rates. It 
was not obvious at that time that there was going to be a bubble. The bubble appears to have 
begun in the second half of 2003. And it had less to do with momentum than with random 
changes in house price growth, which are associated with the decline in short rates and the 
rise of the subprime and ARM business. Breaking out cause and effect during this period 
(e.g., was the subprime surge exogenous or caused by the decline in short rates and good 
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housing market?) is difficult (see Coleman et al. (2008)). However, it looks like something 
important happened during that relatively short period, which caused a strong market to 
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Figure One  Growth Rates of House Price Index, Ten-year Treasury Bonds, 





























































































































































































Table 1  Basic Regression Results for the Fundamental Equation (Various Lags) 
Equation being Difference between Growth Rates of House Prices versus Rent on 
Lagged Changes in 10-year Treasury and Local Rent Growth (MSA Fixed Effects 
Omitted)     
   Variables 12 Lags 16 Lags 20 Lags   24 Lags   
Panel A: Coefficients of Nominal Interest 
Lag 1 0.3084 0.6500 *** 0.8360*** 0.9408*** 
2 0.1308 0.1152 0.1056 0.1696 
3 0.1220 -0.0240 -0.1080 0.2328 
4 0.4172 * -0.0160 0.5108** 0.7460*** 
5 0.3088 0.3340 0.5940** 0.9840*** 
6 0.0080 -0.2880 -0.2800 0.0300 
7 0.2140 -0.1800 -0.8640*** -0.7160*** 
8 -0.4960 ** -1.2040  *** -1.2560*** -1.1400*** 
9 -0.0440 -0.8600 *** -0.8360*** -0.6720*** 
10 -0.1840 -0.5680  *** -0.6360*** -0.6640*** 
11 0.1128 -0.0680 -0.1800 -0.2360 
12 -0.1480 -0.3280 -0.5520** -0.1800 
13  -0.8880 *** -0.9800*** -0.8040*** 
14 -1.6320 *** -1.5840*** -1.1240*** 
15 -0.3880 ** 0.0808 0.4784** 
16 -0.8040 *** -0.6960*** -0.0840 
17  -0.8120*** -0.1560 
18  -0.5840*** -0.1200 
19  0.0408 0.3864* 
20  0.4996** 0.5624*** 
21   1.0080*** 
22   0.6584*** 
23   0.4632** 
24   0.7228*** 
     
Continue… 
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Table 1 Continued 
Panel B: Coefficients of Rent Growth 
Lag 1 0.1618 *** 0.1778 *** 0.1924*** 0.1965*** 
2 0.1869 *** 0.2254 *** 0.2314*** 0.2440*** 
3 0.2290 *** 0.2588 *** 0.2508*** 0.2659*** 
4 0.2449 *** 0.1969 *** 0.1881*** 0.2101*** 
5 0.2773 *** 0.1888 *** 0.1832*** 0.2024*** 
6 0.3448 *** 0.2311 *** 0.2225*** 0.2340*** 
7 0.3439 *** 0.2623 *** 0.2393*** 0.2459*** 
8 -0.0071 0.0860 0.0446 0.0438 
9 -0.0681 0.0678 0.0215 0.0102 
10 -0.1065 ** 0.0731 0.0240 0.0015 
11 -0.0543 0.1531 *** 0.1021* 0.0697 
12 0.0351 0.3122 *** 0.2595*** 0.2174*** 
13 0.3224 *** 0.2697*** 0.2150*** 
14 0.3574 *** 0.3005*** 0.2327*** 
15 0.3367 *** 0.2826*** 0.2009*** 
16 0.1046 *** 0.0597* -0.0362 
17  -0.0452*** -0.1477*** 
18  -0.0545*** -0.1502*** 
19  -0.0301*** -0.1174*** 
20  -0.0086 -0.0871*** 
21   -0.0644*** 
22   -0.0419*** 
23  -0.0122 
24   -0.0044 
    
Adjusted R-square 0.079149 0.101218 0.1375 0.1562 
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
Table 2 Comparison of Sum of Coefficients from the Fundamental Equation (7)  
Coefficients are from Table 1 
 Lag Length 
Variables Lag = 12 Lag = 16 Lag = 20 Lag =24 
Change in Interest Rate 0.7500 -6.1488 -6.7004 1.4868 
Change in Rent Growth 1.5876 3.3543 2.7333 1.9287 
LR effect of Change in 
Interest rate 
100bp 
0.1875 -1.5372 -1.6751 0.3717 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0791 0.1012 0.1375 0.1562 
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Table 3 Comparison of Sums of Coefficients of the Error Equation from the 
Fundamental Equation 
Panel A: Fundamental Model with 12 and 16 lags 
 Fundamental Lag = 12 Fundamental Lag = 16 


























































Difference 0.2803 0.1786 0.1464 0.332 0.2554 0.1896 
Panel B: Fundamental Model with 20 and 24 lags 
 Fundamental Lag = 20 Fundamental Lag = 24 


























































Difference 0.3226 0.2689 0.1476 0.2804 0.2411 0.1356 
Note: Numbers within parentheses are the F-values for testing the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients 
equals 1. All the above results indicate the null hypothesis is rejected, or the coefficients do not sum to 
unity. 
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Table 4 Test of Differences in Variance between the Pre- and Post-Bubble Period in 
the Bubble and Non-Bubble MSAs with Various Lags in the Fundamental 
Equation (7) 
Panel A: Comparing 12-lag versus 16-lag Fundamental Equations 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
 12-lag Fun- damental 
16-lag Fun-
damental GQ Test 
2 12-lag Fun-damental 
16-lag Fun- 
damental GQ Test 
2 
8-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.61 × 10-4 1.50 × 10-4 1.07520 3.61 × 10-4 2.98 × 10-4 1.20986 
Post-1999 1.65 × 10-4 1.09 × 10-4 1.51334* 1.91 × 10-4 1.70 × 10-4 1.12224 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 1.02281 1.37610  1.89082* 1.75388*  
12-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.46 × 10-4 1.44 × 10-4 1.01623 3.02 × 10-4 2.49 × 10-4 1.21276 
Post-1999 1.27 × 10-4 1.05 × 10-4 1.21158 1.70 × 10-4 1.57 × 10-4 1.07893 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 1.15196 1.37340*  1.78437* 1.58746*  
16-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.41 × 10-4 1.23 × 10-4 1.15406 2.52 × 10-4 2.18 × 10-4 1.15502 
Post-1999 1.22 × 10-4 1.02 × 10-4 1.19612 1.92 × 10-4 1.76× 10-4 1.09422 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 1.15831 1.20053  1.31256* 1.24346  
Panel B: Comparing 20-lag versus 24-lag Fundamental Equations 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
 20-lag Fun- damental 
24-lag Fun-
damental GQ Test 
2 20-lag Fun-damental 
24-lag Fun- 
damental GQ Test 
2 
8-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.45 × 10-4 1.44 × 10-4 1.00520 2.95 × 10-4 2.90 × 10-4 1.01513
Post-1999 1.15 × 10-4 1.12 × 10-4 1.02077 1.73 × 10-4 1.69 × 10-4 1.02275 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 1.26526 1.28485  1.70605* 1.71886*  
12-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.40 × 10-4 1.39 × 10-4 1.00345 2.44 × 10-4 2.40 × 10-4 1.01880 
Post-1999 1.12 × 10-4 1.10 × 10-4 1.01870 1.62 × 10-44 1.56 × 10-4 1.03465 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 1.24361 1.26250  1.50958* 1.53305*  
16-lag residuals 
Pre-1999 1.22 × 10-4 1.19 × 10-4 1.02404 2.16 × 10-4 2.09 × 10-4 1.03103 
Post-1999 1.09 × 10-4 1.06 × 10-4 1.02478 1.81 × 10-4 1.77 × 10-4 1.02488 
Pre/Post- 
1999 Test 1 1.11998 1.12078  1.18985 1.18275  
1. The “Pre/Post- 1999 Test” is test for statistical difference between the pre- and post-bubble periods (Goldfeld-
Quandt Test is used).  
2. The “GQ Test” is test for statistical difference between two fundamental equations. 
* implies that the Goldfeld-Quandt Test rejects the null hypothesis that the variances between the 8-lag and 12-





Table 5 Explanatory Power of the Fundamental Model (without Error Equation) on the Cumulative Price 
Change for the Period 1995 – 2000 







% of Price 
Change 
Explained by 








Total % Price 
Changed 
Explained †   
1990 – 1995 
       
 0.23361 0.18770 80.35% 0.04590 281.90% 135.74% 
       
1995 - 2000 
       
 0.22781 0.16358 71.80% 0.06423 171.22% 120.08% 
       
2000 – 2005 
       
 0.37557 0.15113 40.24% 0.22444 55.65% 74.79% 
       
2000 – 2002‡ 
       
 0.18644 0.10609 56.90% 0.08036 81.45% 92.00% 
       
2003 - 2005‡ 
       
 0.18913 0.04505 23.82% 0.14408 41.26% 54.44% 


















































Total % Price 
Changed 
Explained † 
1990 – 1995 
       
 0.13553 0.18349 135.38% -0.04796 -386.07% 271.99% 
       
1995 –  2000 
       
 0.22763 0.14794 64.99% 0.07757 212.11% 139.24% 
       
2000 – 2005 
       
 0.69539 0.21367 30.73% 0.48171 40.48% 58.18% 
       
2000 – 2002 ‡ 
       
 0.26657 0.12631 47.38% 0.14027 71.55% 85.03% 
       
2003 –2005‡ 
       
 0.42882 0.08737 20.37% 0.34145 27.72% 40.76% 
       
 “Average” is the percentage of Average Cumulative Rent Change constituting the Average Cumulative Price 
Change. 
† “Total Price Changed Explained” refers to the proportion of price change explained by rent + fundamental 
model without error equation. 
‡ Notice that the cumulative changes on price, rent and growth rate differences for the period of 2000-2002 and 
2003-2005 do not add up to those for 2000-2005 because all the periods begin from one quarter prior to the 
period for the purpose of differencing. As such, adding the values of 2000-2002 and 2003-2005 double-counts 
























Appendix 1 Annualized Average Growth Rates (in percentage) of Price, Rent, 
Difference between Price and Rent, and Local CPI of Individual MSAs  













Akron, OH  103 3.9768 3.5016 0.4752 3.7448 
Anchorage, AK*  96 3.1673 2.5849 0.5824 2.4593 
Ann Arbor, MI  102 5.1890 3.4639 1.7251 3.5542 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, 
GA  104 4.6340 3.8777 0.7563 7.1204 
Atlantic City, NJ  87 6.5720 3.7304 2.8416 3.2089 
Baltimore-Towson, MD  36 9.2178 4.1863 5.0315 2.5386 
Boston-Quincy, MA *   104 8.2892 4.9242 3.3650 4.0825 
Boulder, CO  104 5.8883 3.7984 2.0899 3.7073 
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA  103 5.4960 3.4012 2.0948 3.6060 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL  104 5.4657 4.3685 1.0972 3.6755 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-
IN  104 3.8449 3.3949 0.4501 3.4088 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH  104 3.9130 3.5016 0.4114 3.7448 
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX  104 3.0029 3.3065 -0.3036 3.5913 
Denver-Aurora, CO  104 4.9855 3.7984 1.1872 3.7073 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI  104 4.7089 3.3968 1.3120 3.4888 
Flint, MI  104 4.6088 3.3968 1.2120 3.4888 
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-
Deerfield Beach, FL * 104 6.4542 3.9566 2.4976 3.8114 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  104 2.7439 3.3065 -0.5626 3.5913 
Gary, IN  104 3.7292 4.3685 -0.6393 3.6755 
Greeley, CO  81 4.6503 2.9757 1.6746 2.8996 
Honolulu, HI * 104 8.4394 4.0158 4.4236 3.6627 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, 
TX  104 2.4987 3.1129 -0.6142 3.2148 
Kansas City, MO-KS  104 3.6772 3.6694 0.0078 3.3558 
Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-
WI  104 5.1801 4.3685 0.8116 3.6755 
Los Angeles-Long *Beach-
Glendale, CA  104 7.2382 4.7031 2.5351 3.7761 























WI  104 4.6754 3.6459 1.0295 3.5204 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-
Bloomington, MN-WI  104 5.2949 3.6892 1.6058 3.7092 
New York-White Plains-Wayne, 
NY-NJ * 104 7.9851 4.6493 3.3358 3.9667 
Philadelphia, PA  104 6.3239 4.3361 1.9878 3.7826 
Pittsburgh, PA  104 3.8733 3.2084 0.6649 3.6355 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, 
OR-WA * 104 5.5337 3.3116 2.2221 3.4013 
Racine, WI  90 5.0893 3.0796 2.0097 2.7917 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, 
CA * 104 6.3798 4.7031 1.6767 3.7761 
Salem, OR  98 5.1685 3.5155 1.6530 3.6083 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, 
CA * 104 7.0325 4.8219 2.2106 4.2708 
San Francisco - San Mateo - 
Redwood City, CA * 104 7.7118 5.0223 2.6895 3.8847 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, 
CA * 104 7.9135 5.0223 2.8912 3.8847 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA * 104 6.2482 3.7498 2.4983 3.8443 
Tacoma, WA * 104 5.9906 3.7498 2.2407 3.8443 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, 
FL * 32 11.0700 4.3738 6.6962 3.7665 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-WV* 36 10.8923 4.1863 6.7061 2.5386 




Appendix 2  Results of Error Equations from 12-Lag Fundamental Equation without 
Lagged Regressands for Non-Bubble versus Bubble MSAs in Pre- and Post-
Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.00095** 0.00302*** -0.00172** 0.00516*** 
1 0.01573 0.22028*** 0.25957*** 0.43179*** 
2 0.07822*** -0.02568 0.20891*** 0.00731 
3 0.13859*** 0.18798*** 0.10497*** 0.47637*** 
4 0.13204*** 0.04012 0.03612 -0.16834*** 
5 -0.00521 0.02137 -0.17012*** -0.11031* 
6 0.01905 0.11412*** 0.10098*** 0.03697 
7 -0.00813 -0.07919* 0.12941*** -0.06612 
8 -0.08406*** 0.26500*** -0.09994*** 0.24249*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0562 0.1626 0.2243 0.4187 
Durbin-Watson  1.9850 1.9740 1.9730 2.0190 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.00062* 0.00297*** -0.00186*** 0.00934*** 
1 0.05778** 0.28179*** 0.36270*** 0.27628*** 
2 0.08313*** -0.07906* 0.15478*** -0.06297 
3 0.13069*** 0.29794*** 0.10197*** 0.49151*** 
4 0.11801*** 0.00786 0.01549 -0.19234*** 
5 0.00439 0.12202*** -0.14836*** -0.04563 
6 0.00487 0.21256*** 0.09097*** 0.13734 
7 0.00589 -0.04647 0.08549** 0.06448 
8 -0.13712*** -0.09046 -0.11944*** 0.11964 
9 0.04381* -0.01510 0.12586*** 0.12166 
10 -0.03215 0.02101 0.01270 -0.03208 
11 0.01385 -0.05034 -0.08950*** -0.14664 
12 0.08612*** 0.11248** -0.04193 -0.00194 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0742 0.2542 0.2839 0.3866 













(Appendix 2 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.00111*** 0.00279*** -0.00235*** 0.01138*** 
1 0.06315** 0.33134*** 0.31679*** 0.24775*** 
2 0.06294** -0.13609** 0.11839*** -0.08545 
3 0.13385*** 0.49802*** 0.17201*** 0.56479*** 
4 0.10465*** -0.08921 -0.00149 -0.26032*** 
5 0.01641 0.17699*** -0.05945* -0.00372 
6 0.02158 0.06852 0.04641 0.03089 
7 0.00586 -0.02039 0.08586*** 0.18675* 
8 -0.11524*** -0.16403** -0.16078*** 0.05888 
9 0.06576** 0.01778 0.11310*** 0.09942 
10 -0.03653 -0.09035 0.02328 -0.02928 
11 0.0351 0.17340** -0.02989 -0.19359 
12 0.0853*** 0.16460** -0.01163 -0.04324 
13 0.00184 -0.00387 -0.06354** 0.04202 
14 -0.06077** 0.09595 -0.00412 -0.02805 
15 -0.0401* -0.12370** -0.03455 0.03175 
16 0.01287 -0.01846 -0.02976 0.00835 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0746 0.3411 0.3123 0.3377 
Durbin-Watson  2.0280 1.9390 1.8700 2.0730 





Appendix 3  Results of Error Equations from 16-Lag Fundamental Equation without 
Lagged Regressands for Non-Bubble versus Bubble MSAs in Pre- and 
Post-Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept 0.00084** 0.00215*** -0.00202*** 0.00549*** 
1 0.09412*** 0.20899*** 0.34501*** 0.40419*** 
2 0.13313*** -0.02702 0.16715*** 0.02651 
3 0.13181*** 0.33066*** 0.11373*** 0.49836*** 
4 0.07433*** 0.10850** -0.03506 -0.14114** 
5 0.02680 0.08167 -0.15655*** -0.17325*** 
6 0.06979*** 0.20891*** 0.10824*** 0.02220 
7 0.06678** -0.07321 0.11624*** -0.05006 
8 -0.03163 -0.01081 -0.08801*** 0.31595*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.1087 0.2813 0.2506 0.4516 
Durbin-Watson  1.9620 1.9740 1.9050 2.0160 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept 0.00070* 0.00292*** -0.00223*** 0.00856*** 
1 0.11434*** 0.27783*** 0.31301*** 0.29564*** 
2 0.09728*** -0.15511*** 0.12204*** -0.08482 
3 0.12082*** 0.42720*** 0.18639*** 0.54866*** 
4 0.0622** 0.03272 -0.03692 -0.17027** 
5 0.01641 0.12682** -0.03713 -0.06366 
6 0.06044** 0.23278*** 0.01037 0.06923 
7 0.04758* -0.07155 0.09149*** 0.06435 
8 -0.03242 -0.02847 -0.11985*** 0.25771*** 
9 0.08160*** -0.08045 0.08138** 0.00368 
10 -0.00606 -0.07036 0.02606 0.04472 
11 0.05132** 0.05390 -0.05979* -0.18226** 
12 0.09207*** 0.12615** -0.03732 0.01211 
Adjusted R-Square 0.1391 0.3473 0.2900 0.3984 












(Appendix 3 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept 0.00074** 0.00274*** -0.00300*** 0.00966*** 
1 0.11734*** 0.21694*** 0.38154*** 0.24951*** 
2 0.13043*** -0.17953*** 0.08315** -0.09332 
3 0.10106*** 0.47163*** 0.15176*** 0.60188*** 
4 0.04029 -0.02046 -0.00624 -0.18295** 
5 0.08787*** 0.22497*** 0.00903 -0.00491 
6 0.03283 0.17461** -0.05900 0.01143 
7 0.05080* 0.00971 0.13309*** 0.15418 
8 -0.06455** -0.06212 -0.10831*** 0.20048** 
9 0.09494*** -0.07795 0.03103 -0.05940 
10 0.00271 -0.04741 0.04059 0.09709 
11 0.08873*** 0.11900* -0.03602 -0.26132* 
12 0.08723*** 0.24447*** 0.02051 -0.01594 
13 -0.01199 -0.01169 -0.06947** 0.05775 
14 -0.05319** 0.11869* -0.04291 -0.11895 
15 0.00468 -0.13692** 0.00113 0.01714 
16 0.01476 -0.05275 -0.05183* 0.01503 
Adjusted R-Square 0.1752 0.4001 0.3173 0.3602 
Durbin-Watson  2.0100 2.0120 2.0540 2.0200 








Appendix 4 Results of Error Equations from Fundamental Equation with 8-Lag 
Regressands for Non-Bubble versus Bubble MSAs in Pre- and Post-
Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.0012 *** 0.0024 *** -0.0024 *** 0.0043 *** 
1 -0.0689 ** 0.1654 *** 0.1722 *** 0.3480 *** 
2 -0.1032 *** -0.1405 *** 0.0614 ** -0.0176 
3 0.0918 *** 0.0553 0.1181 *** 0.4030  *** 
4 -0.0144 -0.1233 *** -0.1325 *** -0.2591 *** 
5 -0.0881*** -0.0114 -0.1060 *** -0.0831 
6 -0.0535 ** 0.0328 0.0107 0.0343 
7 -0.0705 *** -0.0798 * 0.0796 *** -0.0786 
8 -0.0844 *** 0.2829 *** -0.0920 *** 0.1306 ** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0526 0.1297 0.0913 0.2537 
Durbin-Watson  1.938 1.801 1.979 1.998 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.0009 ** 0.0034 *** -0.0023 *** 0.0078 *** 
1 -0.0429 0.3202 *** 0.2001 *** 0.2555 *** 
2 -0.0910 *** -0.2622 *** 0.0872 *** -0.1513 *** 
3 0.0798 *** 0.1869 *** 0.0680 ** 0.4616 *** 
4 -0.0161 -0.1998 *** -0.1141 *** -0.3444 *** 
5 -0.0651 ** -0.0608 -0.1500 *** -0.0200 
6 -0.0148 -0.0118 0.0539 * 0.0850 
7 -0.0427 -0.1642 *** 0.0745 *** 0.0279 
8 -0.1360 *** 0.3332 *** -0.1222 *** 0.0204 
9 0.0142 -0.3454 *** 0.0540 ** 0.0459 
10 -0.0146 0.0991 0.0221 -0.0056 
11 -0.0234 -0.2324 *** -0.0441 * -0.1428 ** 
12 -0.0226 0.0624 -0.0701 *** -0.0965 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0485 0.2119 0.1234 0.271 












(Appendix 4 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.0008 ** 0.0037 *** -0.0024 *** 0.0098 *** 
1 0.0085 0.2554 *** 0.2983 *** 0.1807 *** 
2 -0.0940 *** -0.2357 *** 0.0586 * -0.1659 ** 
3 0.0977 *** 0.1932 *** 0.0728 ** 0.5416 *** 
4 -0.0287 -0.2203 *** -0.1408 *** -0.4077 *** 
5 -0.0435 0.1398 ** -0.1351 *** 0.0075 
6 -0.0249 0.0216 0.0642 ** -0.0191 
7 -0.0395 -0.0684 0.0575 * 0.2096 ** 
8 -0.1643 *** -0.1333 ** -0.1717 *** -0.0494 
9 0.0323 -0.1209 * 0.1211 *** 0.0100 
10 -0.0193 0.0560 0.0004 -0.0143 
11 -0.0097 -0.1708 *** -0.0536 ** -0.1258 
12 0.0252 0.1336 ** -0.0704 *** -0.1899 ** 
13 0.0155 -0.0772 0.0180 0.0239 
14 -0.0060 0.0502 -0.0037 0.0823 
15 -0.0108 -0.0138 -0.0132 -0.0349 
16 -0.0149 0.1534 ** -0.0348 0.0063 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0565 0.1766 0.1959 0.3072 
Durbin-Watson  1.965 1.892 1.927 2.086 




Appendix 5  Results of Error Equations from Fundamental Equation with 12-Lag 
Regressands for Non-Bubble versus Bubble MSAs in Pre- and Post-
Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.0012 *** -0.0021 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0044 *** 
1 -0.0689 ** 0.0809 ** 0.1077 *** 0.2113 *** 
2 -0.1032 *** 0.0700 *** -0.2137 ** -0.0267 
3 0.0918 *** 0.0000 0.0151 0.3144 *** 
4 -0.0144 -0.0197 -0.0748 -0.1263 ** 
5 -0.0881*** -0.1535 -0.0731 *** -0.0999 * 
6 -0.0535 ** 0.0590 0.0141 ** 0.0527 
7 -0.0705 *** 0.0816 *** -0.1310 *** -0.1013 
8 -0.0844 *** -0.1127 *** 0.2376 *** 0.1135 * 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0543 0.1002 0.0542 0.1304 
Durbin-Watson  1.968 1.954 1.989 2.001 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.0009 ** 0.0026 *** -0.0021 *** 0.0081 *** 
1 -0.0767 ** 0.1707 *** 0.1782 *** 0.1124 *** 
2 -0.1100 *** -0.2418 *** 0.0549 * -0.1733 *** 
3 0.0187 0.0938 * 0.0016 0.3327 *** 
4 0.0198 -0.1221 ** -0.0339 -0.2205 *** 
5 -0.0223 0.0261 -0.1384 *** -0.0687 
6 -0.0317 0.0830 * 0.0648 ** 0.1342 ** 
7 -0.0337 -0.0999 ** 0.0590 ** 0.0148 
8 -0.1948 *** -0.1366 ** -0.1538 *** 0.0376 
9 -0.0024 -0.1132 * 0.0901 *** 0.0593 
10 -0.0667 ** -0.0220 0.0000 -0.0090 
11 -0.0040 -0.0601 -0.0473 * -0.0705 
12 0.0693 *** 0.1289 ** -0.0439 * -0.1080 * 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0648  0.1406  0.0983  0.1078  













(Appendix 5 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.0013 *** 0.0029 ***  -0.0022 *** 0.0097 ***  
1 -0.0581 * 0.2730 *** 0.1449 *** 0.0532  
2 -0.1234 *** -0.3271 ***  0.0316 -0.2007 ***  
3 0.0201 0.2929 *** 0.0495 0.4080 ***  
4 0.0037 -0.1658 ** -0.0466 -0.2747 ***  
5 -0.0340 0.1065 * -0.0558 * -0.0334  
6 -0.0275 -0.0039 0.0307 0.0318  
7 -0.0416 -0.0945 * 0.0585 ** 0.1630*  
8 -0.1852 *** -0.2334 *** -0.1732 *** -0.0077  
9 0.0182 0.0028 0.0691 * 0.0034  
10 -0.0680 ** -0.2459 *** -0.0057 -0.0235  
11 -0.0156 0.2023 ** -0.0085 -0.0818  
12 0.0652 ** 0.1475 * -0.0378 -0.1742 **  
13 -0.0206 -0.0242 -0.0170 0.0311  
14 -0.0355 0.0682 -0.0182 0.0299  
15 -0.0263 -0.0734 -0.0251 -0.0579  
16 0.0080 0.0327 -0.0185 0.0182  
Adjusted R-Square 0.0618  0.2563  0.0765  0.2181  
Durbin-Watson  2.0280  2.0210  1.8920  2.0640  
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 6  Regression Results for the Fundamental Equation for Bubble MSAs 
and Non-Bubble MSAs Separated 
  Variables  
   Variables Nominal Interests  Rent Growth  Regressand 
Panel A: Non-Bubble MSAs 
Lag 1 -0.65200 ** 0.08545 * -0.21947 *** 
2 -0.85200 *** 0.13290 * 0.13028 *** 
3 -1.02000 *** 0.10380 0.00696 
4 -0.66000 *** 0.17795 ** 0.22104 *** 
5 -0.25600 0.10759 0.10375 *** 
6 -1.00400  *** 0.14199 * 0.07580 *** 
7 0.31960 0.22916 *** 0.13573 *** 
8 -0.61600 ** 0.11281 ** 0.10386 *** 
    
Adjusted R- 0.25247    
    
Panel B: Bubble MSAs 
Lag 1 0.28320 0.09866 ** 0.11390 *** 
2 -0.34800 0.16700 *** 0.13044 *** 
3 0.07520 0.28606 *** 0.11596 *** 
4 0.26560 0.49461 *** 0.21936 *** 
5 -0.01200 0.44867 *** 0.02737 
6 -0.42000 0.48665 *** 0.01126 
7 -0.12400 0.44597 *** 0.01143 
8 -0.96000 *** -0.00880 0.02318 
    
Adjusted R- 0.22687    
    




Appendix 7 Results of Error Equations with Separation of Non-Bubble and Bubble 
MSAs in Pre- and Post-Bubble Period (various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept 0.00099 *** -0.00254 *** 0.00184 *** 0.00447 *** 
1 0.13516 *** 0.07516 ** 0.53786 *** 0.18425 *** 
2 -0.12286 *** 0.07666 *** -0.39784 *** 0.02370 
3 0.17815 *** 0.07047 ** 0.44936 *** 0.21641 *** 
4 -0.05435 ** -0.12580 *** -0.26742 *** -0.14515 *** 
5 -0.06125 ** -0.13983 *** 0.09191 -0.09551 ** 
6 -0.05020 ** 0.01288 -0.02054 0.03616 
7 -0.08117 *** 0.08362 *** -0.09178 -0.09629 * 
8 -0.04564 ** -0.09072 *** -0.04692 0.31113 *** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0793 0.0664 0.2574 0.1591 
Durbin-Watson  1.938 1.991 2.016 1.873 
Sum of coefficients -0.10216 -0.03756 0.25463 0.4347 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept 0.00080 ** -0.00226 *** 0.00279 *** 0.00790 ***  
1 0.16613 *** 0.09914 *** 0.56779 *** 0.12394 **  
2 -0.09202 *** 0.11065 *** -0.48747 *** -0.10439 **  
3 0.15724 *** 0.02502 0.52716 *** 0.33279 ***  
4 -0.05860 ** -0.10885 *** -0.33241 *** -0.21416 ***  
5 -0.05823 ** -0.17418 *** 0.16204 ** -0.10847 **  
6 -0.01653 0.05036 * 0.01328 0.01600  
7 -0.07130 *** 0.08571 *** -0.12262 * -0.06672  
8 -0.06464 ** -0.12261 *** -0.06870 0.30957 *** 
9 0.02814 0.04245 -0.05150 -0.11414 *  
10 0.00740 0.03863 -0.13741 * 0.04662  
11 -0.02684 -0.04562 * 0.04492 -0.24365 ***  
12 -0.01764 -0.05812 ** 0.04615 -0.05493  
Adjusted R-Square 0.0706 0.098 0.3345 0.2134 
Durbin-Watson  1.953 1.986 1.974 2.070 












(Appendix 7 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept 0.00065 * -0.00236 *** 0.00279 *** 0.00984 *** 
1 0.21999 *** 0.19803 *** 0.54898 *** 0.03237 
2 -0.10882 *** 0.09135 *** -0.48642 *** -0.12456 ** 
3 0.17832 *** 0.02455 0.54877 *** 0.32870 *** 
4 -0.08917 *** -0.13469 *** -0.39248 *** -0.21646 *** 
5 -0.03099 -0.15524 *** 0.27316 *** -0.07251 
6 -0.02698 0.06678 ** -0.04320 0.08423 
7 -0.07308 ** 0.06640 ** -0.06925 0.04278 
8 -0.08411 *** -0.18035 *** -0.10524 0.03212 
9 0.04548 0.11070 *** -0.01847 -0.00945 
10 0.00160 0.02223 -0.16214 * 0.04346 
11 -0.01198 -0.06224 ** 0.04352 -0.27765 *** 
12 0.01884 -0.06946 *** 0.12789 -0.08889 
13 0.00486 0.01393 -0.19258 ** 0.05007 
14 -0.01384 0.00817 0.18351 ** 0.01049 
15 -0.02011 -0.01089 -0.10143 -0.09360 
16 0.00288 -0.03854 * 0.25325 *** 0.04688 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0942 0.1589 0.3568 0.2110 
Durbin-Watson  1.963 1.937 2.031 2.004 
Sum of coefficients 0.01289 -0.04927 0.40787 -0.21202 
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 8 Results of Error Equations with Local Inflation in the Fundamental 
(various lags) 
Panel A: 8-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.00163 *** 0.00163 *** -0.00254 *** 0.00450 *** 
1 -0.05126 * 0.35149 *** 0.17341 *** 0.30734 *** 
2 -0.11513 *** -0.31355 *** 0.06033 *** -0.02939 
3 0.05640 ** 0.32261 *** 0.08594 *** 0.22792 *** 
4 -0.06002 ** -0.18798 *** -0.13008 *** -0.18111 *** 
5 -0.07794 *** 0.08235 -0.12294 *** -0.03666 
6 -0.05090  ** 0.02983 0.03482 0.01674 
7 -0.04720 ** -0.04057 0.07411 *** -0.10121 * 
8 -0.09052  *** -0.06091 -0.08169 *** 0.34916 *** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0446 0.0854 0.1917  0.2266 
Durbin-Watson  1.9800 1.963 1.9890  1.951 
Sum of coefficients -0.43657 0.18327 0.0939 0.55279 
Panel B: 12-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.00139 *** 0.00256 *** -0.00242 *** 0.00841 *** 
1 -0.03334 0.38500 *** 0.19820  *** 0.19789 *** 
2 -0.08873 *** -0.37852 *** 0.08625 *** -0.15115 *** 
3 0.04873 * 0.36500 *** 0.03407 0.36611 *** 
4 -0.04623 -0.25366 *** -0.11899  *** -0.24821 *** 
5 -0.06947 ** 0.13173 ** -0.14020 *** -0.03452 
6 -0.01402 0.03573 0.06468 ** 0.00068 
7 -0.05271 ** -0.01728 ** 0.05410 * -0.06351 
8 -0.11545 *** -0.15394 -0.11180 *** 0.36649 *** 
9 0.01773 0.10067 0.05457 * -0.12022 * 
10 -0.00812 -0.17881 ** 0.02794 0.06897 
11 -0.03055 0.08946 -0.04311 -0.27996 *** 
12 -0.01969 0.00766 -0.07415 *** -0.00499 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0356  0.1122  0.2062  0.2496  
Durbin-Watson  1.9940  1.9940  1.9520  2.0880  












(Appendix 8 continued) 
Panel C: 16-lags 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 







Intercept -0.00135 *** 0.00287 *** -0.00272 *** 0.01004 *** 
1 0.01409 0.35994 *** 0.31673 *** 0.13401 ** 
2 -0.09413 *** -0.34498 *** -0.01439 -0.15430 ** 
3 0.07158 ** 0.35902 *** 0.07945 *** 0.35390 *** 
4 -0.07171 ** -0.28205 *** -0.14695 *** -0.25443 *** 
5 -0.05146 * 0.18385 ** -0.11819 *** -0.00621 
6 -0.02238 0.00128 0.07680 ** 0.09674 
7 -0.04575 0.00041 0.04431 0.01795 
8 -0.14399 *** -0.20864 *** -0.15929 *** 0.03153 
9 0.05920 ** 0.14061 0.10566 *** 0.14057 
10 -0.03514 -0.25528 *** -0.00720 -0.00722 
11 -0.02240 0.10516 -0.03656 -0.31179 *** 
12 -0.00498 0.00303 -0.06739 ** -0.01240 
13 -0.00623 -0.10628 0.00562 0.02602 
14 0.00366 0.04570 0.00054 -0.03296 
15 -0.00429 -0.01619 -0.02032 -0.08671 
16 0.01174 0.10674 -0.03923 0.06824 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0469   0.2018  0.1824  0.2507  
Durbin-Watson  1.9910  2.0060  1.9940  2.0350  
Sum of coefficients -0.34219 0.09232 0.01959 0.00294 
“***”, “**”, “*” represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Appendix 9 Test of Differences in Variance between the Pre- and Post-Bubble Period 
in the Bubble and Non-Bubble MSAs in Fundamental Equations  
Panel A: Separated Regressions on Non-Bubble and Bubble MSAs  
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Error 
Equation Pre-1999 Post-1999 GQ Test 
1 Pre-1999 Post-1999 GQ Test 1 
8-lag  1.72 × 10-4 1.38 × 10-4 1.2396  3.94 × 10-4 2.94 × 10-4 1.3395 *  
12-lag 1.55 × 10-4 1.44 × 10-4 1.0791  3.90 × 10-4 2.74 × 10-4 1.4236 * 
16-lag 1.51 × 10-4 1.48 × 10-4 1.0254  3.49 × 10-4 2.53 × 10-4 1.3755 * 
Panel B: Local Inflation Added as Regressors 
 Non-Bubble MSAs Bubble MSAs 
Error 
Equation Pre-1999 Post-1999 GQ Test 
1 Pre-1999 Post-1999 GQ Test 1 
8-lag  1.57 × 10-4 1.18  × 10-4 1.33123 * 3.90 × 10-4 3.30 × 10-4 1.18236  
12-lag 1.50 × 10-4 1.25  × 10-4 1.20338  3.88 × 10-4 2.94 × 10-4 1.31859 * 
16-lag 1.46 × 10-4 1.30 × 10-4 1.11997  3.48 × 10-4 2.72 × 10-4 1.27802  
1. GQ Test compares the variances between the pre- and post-1999 period. 
* implies that the Goldfeld-Quandt Test rejects the null hypothesis that the variances between the 8-lag and 12-
lag fundamental equations are statistically the same at 5% significance level (compared to an F-value of 1.3) 
 
  
 
